Workshop Knowlege, Mind and the First Person
On Wednesday 2 December 2009 the Leiden Institute for Philosophy organises the workshop "Knowlege, Mind and the First Person".
- Knowledge, Mind and the First Person
- The first-person perspective is a vibrant and much-debated area of research, not just in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of logic and language, but also in practical philosophy. The aim of the workshop is to bring these different perspectives together. One of the central questions is how we can consistently defend the idea that the foundation of logic is in a
first-person mental or linguistic act and that logic is not subjective. Dan Zahavi and Marc Slors are working on the idea of the first-person in the philosophy of mind, whereas Maria van der Schaar is working on this idea in philosophy of logic and language.
- Programme
- The workshop will be held from 12.00 to 18.00 hrs. and takes place in Gravensteen, room 11 (Pierskerkhof 6).
12.00 - 13.30 Dan Zahavi
Mindedness, Mindlessness and First-Person Authority
13.45 - 14.45
Lunch
14.45 - 16.15
Marc Slors
First-Person Authority and the New Unconscious
16.15 - 16.30
Coffee, tea, biscuits
16.30 - 18.00
Maria van der Schaar
Knowledge, Assertion and the First Person
- Speakers
- Dan Zahavi is professor of Philosophy and director of the Danish National Research Foundation’s Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. He obtained his Ph.D. from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in 1994 and his Dr.phil. (Habilitation) from the University of Copenhagen in 1999. He was elected member of the Institut International de Philosophie in 2001 and of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in 2007. He has served as president of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology in the years 2001-2007, and is currently co-editor in chief of the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. In his systematic work, Zahavi has mainly been investigating the nature of selfhood, self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. His most important publications include Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität (Kluwer 1996), Self-awareness and Alterity (Northwestern University Press 1999), Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford University Press 2003), Subjectivity and Selfhood (MIT Press 2005), and together with Shaun Gallagher The Phenomenological Mind (Routledge 2008).
Marc Slors is professor of Philosophy of Mind at the Radboud University Nijmegen. His research interests include personal identity, mental causation and the ontology of mind and social cognition. He is currently working on the implications of cultural variation in conceptions of the mind for theories of the mind-brain relation. His books and papers include "Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It Is to Adopt the Intentional Stance" (Philosophical Quarterly 1996), The Diachronic Mind (Springer 2001), "Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: an Alternative for Q-Memory” (Journal of Philosophy 2001), "Intentional Systems Theory, Mental Causation and Empathic Resonance” (Erkenntnis 2007) and "The Narrative Practice Hypothesis and Externalist Theory Theory: For Compatibility, Against Collapse” (Journal of Consciousness Studies 2009). He is associate editor of Philosophical Explorations.
Maria van der Schaar is assistant professor at the Institute for Philosophy, Leiden University, and associated member at the Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, CNRS, Paris. She defended her PhD on the theory of judgement and the origin of analytic philosophy in Leiden, 1991, and has been working on the theory of judgement ever since. Her work is partly systematic, partly historical. She has, for example, written on logic and the theory of judgement in Brentano (Brentano Studien, 10, 2002/3) and his school, for example, on Twardowski (Grazer Philosophische Studien, 67, 2004). Furthermore, she has written on judgement and negation (The Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm, The Library of Living Philosophers, XXV, 1997, 291-318). Recently, she has been working on the theory of judgement in Locke and the Port Royal (History and Philosophy of Logic, 29, 2008). The modern counterpart to the notion of judgement is that of assertion, and she is now working on the theory of assertion (‘The assertion-candidate and the meaning of mood’, Synthese, 159, 2007).
